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HOW ZIGLAR V. ABBASI SHEDS LIGHT ON 
QUALIFIED-IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, a man was involved in a road rage incident on a public highway 
in New Mexico. Two women called 911 to report the man as a drunk driver 
who was swerving while driving. The women then drove close behind the 
man, keeping on their bright lights, until the man, feeling threatened, pulled 
over on the off-ramp of the highway. The man spoke with the women and 
asked them why they were following him. There was no physical altercation 
or violence. The man then left the off-ramp and drove to his house where he 
lived with his brother. 
Around 10:00 p.m., an officer responding to the women’s 911 call 
arrived at the off-ramp and interviewed the two women. The women gave 
the officer the man’s license plate number, and the women then left. Two 
other officers joined the interviewing officer on the off-ramp, and the three 
decided to investigate, though they decided that there was insufficient 
probable cause to arrest the man. One of the officers stayed on the off-ramp 
in case the man returned. The other two officers drove in separate police 
cars to the address registered with the license plate, and neither officer 
turned on his vehicle’s police lights.  
Arriving at the man’s rural, secluded house, each officer parked his car 
at a distance not visible from the house and covertly approached the 
residence. The officers used their flashlights intermittently. The officers saw 
a light on inside the house and the man and his brother moving around 
inside. Around 11:00 p.m., noticing that there were people outside using 
flashlights, the man and his brother yelled out, “Who are you?” and “What 
do you want?” to which the officers responded, “Hey motherfuckers, we got 
you surrounded. Come out or we’re coming in.” The man and his brother 
did not hear the officers identify themselves as police at any point, and they 
did not see any police vehicles. They believed that they were being attacked, 
perhaps because of the earlier road rage incident. At that point, the man’s 
brother yelled, “we have guns,” opened a side door, and fired two shotgun 
shots into the air to try to scare off the potential attackers. 
Meanwhile, the third officer arrived on the scene and covertly 
approached the house. He heard the “we have guns” statement, followed by 
the shots, and feared for his and his co-officers’ safety. One of the officers 
shot at the brother and missed. The third officer then shot at the brother and 
killed him.  











In White v. Pauly,1 from which the above facts are based, the brother’s 
estate sued the three officers for Fourth Amendment excessive force 
violations, and the officers moved for summary judgment asserting the 
defense of qualified immunity.2 
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity when the 
official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”3 The 
Supreme Court in White v. Pauly suggested that the third officer’s conduct 
did not violate clearly established law and remanded the case to the Tenth 
Circuit.4 The Tenth Circuit found that the officer who shot the brother was 
entitled to qualified immunity.5 The court granted the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment against the plaintiff’s constitutional claim, holding 
that the officer did not violate clearly established law because the court 
could not identify any case “close enough on point to make the unlawfulness 
of [the officer’s] action apparent.”6 
The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow law enforcement officers 
and government officials room to breathe in performing their duties so that 
they may make “reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal 
questions” without fear of suit.7 There is a fundamental tension in qualified-
immunity cases between the societal need for officers to be able to exercise 
discretion without fear of suit on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
constitutional and statutory rights of citizens.8 In the last three decades, 
however, qualified immunity has expanded incredibly, creating an almost 
insurmountable hurdle for civil rights plaintiffs.9  
                                                      
1. 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam). 
2. Id. at 550. 
3. Id. at 551 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). 
4. Id. at 552–53. 
5. Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1223 (10th Cir. 2017). 
6. Id. at 1223 (citation omitted) (quoting Pauly v. White, 814 F.3d 1060, 1091 (10th Cir. 2016)). 
7. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). 
8. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two 
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 
perform their duties reasonably.”).  
9. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 41 HUM. RTS. 5, 7 (2014) 
(summarizing cases that “show a Court that is very protective of government officials who are sued for 
money damages and that has made it very difficult for victims of constitutional violations to recover”); 
Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
HEADNOTES 62, 78 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Kinports 
_PDF1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3GR-FZWZ] (“In recent years, the Supreme Court opinions applying the 
qualified immunity defense have engaged in a pattern of describing the defense in increasingly generous 
terms and qualifying and deviating from past precedent—without offering any justification or even 












While there are many historical reasons for the expansion of qualified 
immunity,10 this Note examines the current state of the qualified-immunity 
doctrine, focusing specifically on the analytical procedure used by courts to 
decide qualified-immunity cases. In 2001, the Supreme Court held that 
lower courts ruling on qualified-immunity cases were required to decide 
both prongs of the qualified-immunity inquiry—i.e., courts were required 
to decide both (1) whether the official’s conduct would amount to a 
constitutional or statutory violation, and (2) whether the relevant law at the 
time of the official’s conduct was clearly established.11 In 2009, in Pearson 
v. Callahan,12 the Supreme Court overturned Saucier’s rule of mandatory 
sequencing after just eight years of its controversial application in qualified-
immunity cases.13 The Pearson Court held, instead, that in deciding 
qualified-immunity cases courts now need only to decide the clearly-
established prong of the qualified-immunity two-part inquiry.14 Under 
Pearson, if a court finds that the law was not clearly established at the time 
of the official’s conduct, the court has discretion whether or not to decide 
the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claim.15 
This Note proposes a new four-part balancing test which courts should 
use in choosing whether to decide both prongs of the qualified-immunity 
analysis, as in Saucier, or to decide only the clearly-established prong, as in 
Pearson. Part I traces the history and development of the Court’s qualified-
immunity jurisprudence in order to shed light on the order-of-battle 
dilemma. Part II explains the empirical effects of Pearson on plaintiffs’ 
efforts to vindicate their civil rights. Part III focuses on the Supreme Court’s 
recent employment of Pearson discretion in Ziglar v. Abbasi16 to highlight 
four important concerns of qualified-immunity doctrine and to propose a 
new balancing test for the employment of Pearson discretion. The goal of 
this Note is to give courts a more nuanced standard for when to employ 
Pearson discretion, thus allowing vindication of plaintiffs’ rights while 
respecting the importance of the qualified-immunity defense for 
government officials. 
                                                      
10. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 51–58 
(summarizing the historical development and expansion of qualified immunity doctrine).  
11. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified 
immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the 
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? . 
. . [I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential 
step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”) (emphasis added). 
12. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
13. Id. at 236. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 











I. THE SUPREME COURT’S QUALIFIED-IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND THE 
ORDER-OF-BATTLE DILEMMA 
The main purpose of qualified immunity is “to shield [public officials] 
from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling 
threats of liability.”17 A government officer is entitled to the defense of 
qualified immunity unless his or her conduct violates “clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”18 Put another way, in order for a plaintiff to defeat an officer’s 
qualified-immunity defense, she must show both (1) that the officer violated 
her statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that this right was clearly 
established at the time of the officer’s alleged violation.19 Qualified 
immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”20 
In 2001, the Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz21 mandated that a court 
ruling on a qualified-immunity defense must first consider the merits of the 
alleged constitutional or statutory violation—that is, the court must initially 
decide, “do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right?”22 Only after that threshold inquiry should a court 
decide whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the officer’s 
conduct.23 The Court stated that “in the course of determining whether a 
constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find 
it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding 
that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the law’s 
elaboration from case to case . . . .”24 It reasoned that “[t]he law might be 
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the 
question whether the law [was] clearly established,” without deciding 
whether the officer’s underlying conduct would amount to a statutory or 
constitutional violation. 25 The Court reasoned that requiring lower courts to 
decide the merits prong was essential in order to prevent the risk of 
constitutional stagnation that might result if courts decided only the clearly-
established prong.26 The Saucier Court worried that if a court granted 
                                                      
17. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
18. Id. at 818. 
19. See id. 
20. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1986)). 
21. 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
22. Id. at 201 (“Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts 
















qualified immunity only because it could not identify a case “close enough 
on point to make the unlawfulness of [the officer’s] action apparent”27 
without ruling on the underlying constitutional issue, constitutional 
questions of first impression may never be resolved.28 
The Court’s decision in Saucier received significant backlash amongst 
both judges and legal scholars because it did, in fact, have many problems.29 
Accordingly, in 2009 in Pearson v. Callahan30 the Supreme Court 
overturned Saucier’s mandated “order of battle.”31 In Pearson, the Supreme 
Court fundamentally changed the procedure for granting government 
officials qualified immunity.32 It held that courts, when performing a 
qualified-immunity analysis, were no longer required to decide the merits 
of a plaintiff’s underlying constitutional or statutory claim.33 Instead, a court 
may grant qualified immunity whenever it finds that the law at the time of 
the official’s conduct was not clearly established—that the government 
official did not act unreasonably given the current open-ended status of the 
law—without deciding whether the officer’s conduct in fact amounted to a 
statutory or constitutional violation.34 Once a court finds that the law was 
not clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct, it has discretion 
whether or not to decide the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claim.35 
Thus, in Pearson, the Court relaxed Saucier’s mandated sequencing, 
encouraging lower courts instead to exercise discretion in choosing which 
determinations to make in a qualified-immunity case—either to adhere to 
Saucier’s two-pronged analysis and decide both the merits and clearly-
established prongs or to decide the clearly-established prong only.36 
                                                      
27. Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1223 (10th Cir. 2017). 
28. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
29. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer J., concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (“I would end the failed Saucier experiment now.”); Karen M. Blum, 
Section 1983 Litigation: Post-Pearson and Post-Iqbal, 26 TOURO L. REV. 433, 433–34 nn.6–7 (2010) 
(collecting criticisms of Saucier’s mandated sequencing by Supreme Court Justices and lower courts); 
see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 
115, 116 (“Not only did Saucier have its critics, but the critics had a point. They successfully identified 
circumstances . . . where the merits-first, immunity-second order of battle proved genuinely awkward.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An 
Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 670 (2009) (arguing against the underlying rationale of 
Saucier’s mandated sequencing and concluding that sequencing does not lead to “the expansion of 
constitutional rights”). 
30. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
31. Id. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the 
sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. 
35. Id. (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise 
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first . . . .”). 
36. Id. 











The Pearson Court acknowledged that the Saucier two-prong analysis is 
beneficial because it “promotes the development of constitutional precedent 
and is especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently 
arise in cases in which a qualified-immunity defense is unavailable,” 37 such 
as excessive force claims. The Court, however, encouraged lower courts to 
balance such beneficial development of precedent against the risk of 
“substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions 
that have no effect on the outcome of the case,”38 especially in “cases in 
which the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision provides 
little guidance for future cases.”39 The Pearson Court went on to enumerate 
approximately ten overlapping factors that courts should take into account 
when determining whether to first decide the merits prong or the clearly-
established prong in a qualified-immunity case.40 According to Pearson, a 
court should depart from Saucier’s two-pronged procedure and decide only 
the clearly-established prong in a qualified-immunity case when the 
following ten factors are satisfied: 
1. If resolving the constitutional or statutory question would result in 
a “substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult 
questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case”;41 
2. If it is “plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established 
but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right”;42 
3. If litigation of the constitutional or statutory question would 
“waste[] the parties’ resources”;43 
4. If the constitutional or statutory question is “so factbound that the 
decision [would provide] little guidance for future cases”;44 
5. If the constitutional or statutory question will “soon be decided by 
a higher court”;45 
6. If the constitutional or statutory question is “resting on an uncertain 
interpretation of state law”;46 
7. If resolving the constitutional or statutory question “depends on a 
                                                      
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 236–37. 
39. Id. at 237. 
40. See id. at 236–42. 
41. Id. at 236–37. 
42. Id. at 237. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 













kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed”;47 
8. If the briefing on the constitutional or statutory question is 
“woefully inadequate”;48 
9. If resolving the constitutional or statutory question would “make it 
hard for affected parties to obtain appellate review of constitutional 
decisions that may have a serious prospective effect on their 
operations”;49 and 
10. If resolving the constitutional or statutory question would 
“depart[] from the general rule of constitutional avoidance.”50 
Since Pearson, the ten-part balancing test has overwhelmed courts, 
leading many courts to employ Pearson discretion without explaining their 
rationale for doing so.51 Pearson, like Saucier, has received a substantial 
amount of criticism from legal scholars who argue that “the repeated 
invocation of qualified immunity” without resolving the underlying 
constitutional and statutory issues at play “will reduce the meaning of the 
Constitution to the lowest plausible conception of its content.”52 Saucier’s 
mandatory sequencing is unworkable in practice, but Pearson discretion 
leaves many plaintiffs without vindication of their constitutional or statutory 
rights and prevents the law from moving forward. Thus, there seems to be 
no correct “order of battle.”53 
II. THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF PEARSON V. CALLAHAN ON PLAINTIFFS’ 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 
While the Saucier Court found that the risk of constitutional stagnation 
caused by deciding only one prong of the two-pronged qualified-immunity 
                                                      
47. Id. at 239 (quoting Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F.3d 65, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2002)). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 240. 
50. Id. at 241. 
51. See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 53–60 (2015) (recognizing “the post-Pearson empirical realities of the new qualified immunity” 
and drawing on administrative law principles to argue that courts should be required to give reasons 
when exercising Pearson discretion).  
52. Jeffries, supra note 29, at 120–21; see also Nielson & Walker, supra note 51, at 52 (“Whereas 
the core constitutional stagnation fear expressed about Pearson discretion is probably exaggerated, the 
facts on the ground nevertheless show that Pearson is not perfect. There appears to be some stagnation 
with respect to rights-making; variation across the circuits; and the potential of substantive 
asymmetries.”); Alan K. Chen, Qualified Immunity Limiting Access to Justice and Impeding 
Development of the Law, 41 HUM. RTS. 8, 9 (2014) (“[I]n cases involving cutting-edge issues of 
constitutional law, qualified immunity may itself prevent the law from ever becoming clearly 
established.”). 
53. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 











inquiry was unacceptable,54 the Pearson Court found such a risk was 
tolerable.55  
The risk of constitutional stagnation is more significant than the Pearson 
Court anticipated.56 As scholars Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg explain, 
“[t]he stakes are high because the difference between mandatory or 
discretionary sequencing may bear on the frequency with which courts 
address substantive constitutional rights questions, which in turn impacts 
the ‘rate’ at which constitutional rights are ‘clearly established’ through 
precedents.”57 According to another scholar, a move from Saucier’s two-
pronged analysis means that, “[f]unctionally, the Constitution will be 
defined not by what judges, in their wisdom, think it does or should mean, 
but by the most grudging conception that an executive officer could 
reasonably entertain.”58 
One unforeseen effect of Pearson v. Callahan is that the Supreme Court 
itself has employed Pearson discretion in a number of cases, declining to 
resolve the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and instead finding only that the law 
at the time of the officer’s conduct was not clearly established. As of the 
2017 term, in the last eight years since Pearson was decided the Supreme 
Court has granted qualified immunity in approximately fourteen 
decisions.59 Of these fourteen cases, the majority have been either issues of 
Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure, or Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims.60 Of these fourteen cases, 
the Supreme Court has itself employed Pearson discretion in eleven 
                                                      
54. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
55. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
57. Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity 
Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 525, 556 (2010) (analyzing 741 
qualified immunity decisions from federal courts of appeals following Pearson, and finding that 
“plaintiffs found by the court to have successfully alleged a constitutional violation in the pre-Saucier 
period were eleven percent more likely to ultimately recover damages than their counterparts post-
Saucier”). 
58. Jeffries, supra note 28, at 120–121 (“What may not be quite so obvious, but is in fact far 
more important, is the degradation of constitutional rights that may result when Saucier is not followed 
and constitutional tort claims are resolved solely on grounds of qualified immunity. For rights that 
depend on vindication through damage actions, the repeated invocation of qualified immunity will 
reduce the meaning of the Constitution to the lowest plausible conception of its content.”).  
59. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 
(2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 
2045 (2015); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 
135 S. Ct. 348, 352 (2014); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 
2056, 2061 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022–23 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 
3, 7 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 
556 (2012); Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). 
60. See, e.g., White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (excessive force); Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 352 (unreasonable 
search and seizure); Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2022–23 (excessive force); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 












decisions.61 That is, in eleven of the fourteen Supreme Court decisions 
granting qualified immunity since Pearson, the Supreme Court held only 
that the law was not clearly established because no reasonable officer could 
have known the law at the time of the officer’s conduct.62 It did not decide 
whether plaintiff’s claim would amount to a Fourth Amendment, Eighth 
Amendment, or Fourteenth Amendment violation respectively.63 In so 
doing, the Court declined to clearly establish the law in a way that would 
allow a civil rights plaintiff to succeed against a qualified-immunity defense 
in the future. When the Supreme Court declines to establish the law by 
opting not to make a determination on the merits, any officer in the future 
that performs the same constitutional violation under similar facts will be 
entitled to qualified immunity under a not-clearly-established standard.64 
It seems that nowhere in the Pearson decision did the Court contemplate 
that the Supreme Court itself would be employing Pearson discretion so 
frequently. In fact, on a plain reading of the Pearson opinion, the Court 
appears to relax Saucier’s mandatory sequencing for “[d]istrict courts and 
courts of appeals with heavy caseloads” only.65 Throughout the opinion, the 
Court makes numerous references to the lower courts,66 and even bases its 
conclusion on its “respect for the lower federal courts that bear the brunt of 
adjudicating these cases.”67 The Pearson Court reasoned that “the judges of 
the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to 
determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and 
efficient disposition of each case.”68 Nowhere in its opinion does the 
Pearson Court seem to contemplate the constitutional stagnation that may 
result if the Supreme Court itself becomes free to employ Pearson 
discretion at will. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court contemplate what 
would happen if the country’s court of highest resort declined to define 
                                                      
61. See, e.g., Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869; White, 137 S. Ct. at 551; Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308; 
Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2045; City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1778; Carroll, 135 S. 
Ct. at 352; Wood, 134 S. Ct. at 2061; Stanton, 571 U.S. at 7; Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664; Messerschmidt, 
565 U.S. at 556; Ryburn, 565 U.S. at 477. In three of the fourteen cases, the Supreme Court carried out 
Saucier’s two-pronged analysis and first decided whether the officer violated the alleged right, in 
addition to deciding if the right was clearly established at the time of his or her conduct. See, e.g., Lane, 
134 S. Ct. at 2383; Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022–23; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743. 
62. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 61. 
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
65. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009). 
66. See, e.g., id. at 236 (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be 
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 242 (“Our decision does not prevent the lower courts from following 
the Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that those courts should have the discretion to decide 
whether that procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.”) (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at 242. 
68. Id. (emphasis added). 











statutory or constitutional rights, instead holding only that the law in 
question was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. 
The over-employment of Pearson discretion by the Supreme Court is 
alarming because it curtails the rate at which law becomes clearly 
established,69 especially where the Supreme Court hears qualified-immunity 
cases with unusual frequency.70 
III. THE ROLE OF PEARSON DISCRETION IN ZIGLAR V. ABBASI 
The next part of this Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Ziglar v. Abbasi71 to propose a way in which a court, and especially the 
Supreme Court, may limit its use of Pearson discretion, and thereby curtail 
the expansion of qualified immunity.  
In Ziglar, six alien detainees of Arab or South Asian descent who were 
detained after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks sued federal officials 
and detention facility wardens, challenging the constitutionality of their 
detention.72 The detainees brought Bivens actions alleging that the officials 
violated their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.73 The detainees also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1985(3), arguing that the officers engaged in a civil conspiracy to deny them 
equal protection of the laws based on racial animus.74  
Section 1985(3), originally Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, provides 
a remedy for individuals who are injured when two or more persons 
“conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons 
of the equal protection of the laws.”75 The law was initially passed as “an 
attempt to stop the assaults, murders, and property destruction” perpetuated 
by the Klan by creating a right of action against two or more persons who 
                                                      
69. See Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 57, at 525. 
70. See Baude, supra note 10, at 82–88 (analyzing “the Supreme Court’s special treatment of 
qualified immunity issues on its certiorari docket”). 
71. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).  
72. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1848–53. 
73. See id. at 1848 (“[T]his Court recognized in Bivens an implied damages action to compensate 
persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)). 
74. Id. at 1851–52. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2017). Section 1985(3) provides in relevant part:  
“If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, 
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, 
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in 
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in 
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured . . . the party so injured 














conspire to injure another because of race.76 Currently, § 1985(3) is the 
“only federal civil statute enacted specifically to address race-based 
conspiracies.”77  
Prior to Ziglar, there was a long-standing circuit split regarding the 
applicability of § 1985(3) protections when the alleged co-conspirators are 
agents of a single entity, for example, two officers acting together as agents 
of the federal government.78 In the corporate context, generally an 
agreement between two agents of a single corporation does not qualify as a 
conspiracy because the two agents’ actions are attributable to the principle 
entity.79 This doctrine—known as the intracorporate-conspiracy 
exception—is most often invoked in antitrust disputes.80 Before Ziglar, 
courts were divided on whether such an intracorporate-conspiracy exception 
could bar plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) claims against two or more government 
officials acting on behalf of the government.81 The Supreme Court itself had 
declined to resolve the circuit split on multiple occasions ranging back to 
1979.82 Ziglar thus presented the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
decide the applicability of the intracorporate-conspiracy exception to § 
1985(3) claims in almost twenty years.83 
The officials in Ziglar argued that they were entitled to qualified 
immunity against the plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) civil-conspiracy claim because 
the law at the time of their conduct was not clearly established.84 The 
Supreme Court granted the officials qualified immunity, finding that a 
reasonable officer in the position of the officials would not have known that 
his or her conduct was an unlawful conspiracy because of the long-standing 
circuit split relating to the application of the intracorporate-conspiracy 
                                                      
76. Catherine E. Smith, (Un)masking Race-Based Intracorporate Conspiracies Under the Ku 
Klux Klan Act, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 130 (2004). 
77. Id. at 131. 
78. Compare Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed on 
§ 1985(3) claims even when alleged co-conspirators were agents acting on behalf of a single entity), 
with Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(barring plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim where alleged co-conspirators were acting as agents of a single 
entity). 
79. See J.S. Nelson, The Corporate Conspiracy Vacuum, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 255 (2015) 
(“The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that because an association and its agents, such as its 
employees, are one legal entity, there are no two distinct minds that can meet to conspire.”). 
80. Id. 
81. See supra note 78. 
82. See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 n.11 (1979) (“For the 
purposes of this question, we assume but certainly do not decide that the directors of a single corporation 
can form a conspiracy within the meaning of § 1985(3).”); see also Hull v. Shuck, 501 U.S. 1261 (1991) 
(denying petition for certiorari from the 6th Circuit to decide the issue, against J. White and J. Marshall’s 
dissent). 
83. Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868 (2017); see also supra note 82 and accompanying 
text. 
84. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866. 











exception to § 1985(3) claims.85 The Ziglar Court found that “[w]hen the 
courts are divided on an issue so central to the cause of action alleged, a 
reasonable official lacks the notice required before imposing liability.”86 
The Court, however, did not decide the merits issue—whether the 
intracorporate-conspiracy exception does in fact bar a plaintiff’s § 1985(3) 
civil-conspiracy claim—stating specifically that “[n]othing in this opinion 
should be interpreted as either approving or disapproving the intracorporate-
conspiracy doctrine’s application in the context of an alleged § 1985(3) 
violation.”87 It found only that a reasonable officer could not have known if 
the exception applies because the law at the time of the officials’ conduct 
was not clearly established.88 
In short, the Court exercised Pearson discretion. It found that the 
officials were entitled to qualified immunity only because the law at the 
time of their conduct was not clearly established, and it reserved judgment 
on the merits of the legal issue.89 
Had the Court in Ziglar followed Saucier’s two-pronged sequencing for 
qualified immunity, the Court would have had to resolve whether the 
intracorporate-conspiracy exception applies to § 1985(3) claims and could 
still have granted the officers qualified immunity based on the unsettled law 
at the time of the officers’ conduct.90 Instead, even after Ziglar, the 
applicability of the intracorporate-conspiracy exception to civil-conspiracy 
claims remains “not clearly established,” and future plaintiffs will be unable 
to overcome a qualified-immunity defense to civil conspiracy.91 Going 
forward, any future plaintiffs that bring suit against officials who conspire 
to unconstitutionally detain citizens due to race-based animosity will 
receive no benefit from Ziglar’s holding. The officers in such a situation 
will still be entitled to qualified immunity because the Court declined to 
                                                      
85. Id. at 1868–69. 
86. Id. at 1868. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. Note also that prior to Ziglar, and not expressly mentioned by the Court in its opinion, 
there was a circuit split even relating to the availability of a qualified-immunity defense for government 
officers against § 1985(3) claims because § 1985(3) claims require such a strict showing of race-based 
animus. Compare Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that qualified 
immunity applies in § 1985(3) lawsuits), with Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 126 F.3d 1372, 1378–
80 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that, while qualified immunity was available under § 1981 and § 
1983 claims, it is not available to federal officers against a § 1985(3) claim). The Eleventh Circuit had 
previously found that “[d]enying public officials qualified immunity under section 1985(3) does not 
threaten the breathing space they need for making discretionary decisions” because “‘racial, or perhaps 
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus’ has no place in public policy and any actions 
by public officials based on such animus deserve to be chilled with the full force of federal law.” Burrell 
v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 970 F.2d 785, 794 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joinders of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983)). 













settle the unresolved law.92 Plaintiffs who bring § 1985(3) claims in the 
future will perpetually lose to qualified immunity. If a § 1985(3) claim 
makes it to the Supreme Court again, under the current ten-part balancing 
test, the Court will be able to again exercise Pearson discretion and find 
only that the law is not clearly established, thus leaving the law in perpetual 
flux. In this way, Ziglar is a good example of the dangers of unchecked 
Pearson discretion. When courts, including the Supreme Court, consistently 
decline to recognize underlying constitutional or statutory rights through 
Saucier sequencing, those rights remain indefinitely unclear and officers 
who violate them are thereby insulated from liability. Through unchecked 
Pearson discretion, qualified immunity becomes a functionally 
insurmountable hurdle for future civil rights plaintiffs. 
There are ways of respecting the Pearson Court’s concerns for qualified 
immunity, while limiting the expansion of qualified immunity so that cases 
like Ziglar would not have such a devastating effect for future civil rights 
plaintiffs. Looking at the ten interlacing factors articulated by the Pearson 
Court,93 four main concerns emerge: (1) judicial economy; (2) preservation 
for appellate review; (3) issues of law versus fact; and (4) constitutional 
avoidance. Balancing those four factors in Ziglar would have led the Court 
to a different, and better, result. 
A. Judicial Economy and the Parties’ Resources 
The Pearson Court recognized that Saucier’s two-step sequencing is 
beneficial particularly in cases “in which there would be little if any 
conservation of judicial resources to be had by beginning and ending with . 
. . the clearly established prong.”94 Two-pronged sequencing is less 
beneficial when it “results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial 
resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the 
case.”95 In cases in which deciding both the merits prong and clearly-
established prong would result in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial 
resources, courts are better advised to employ Pearson discretion and only 
decide if the law was clearly established.96 
Resolving the statutory question at issue in Ziglar would not have 
resulted in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources. Instead, 
                                                      
92. See id. 
93. See supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. 
94. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
95. Id. at 236–37. 
96. Id.; see also 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3573.3 (West 3d ed. Sept. 2018 Supp.) (arguing that the Pearson holding is “salutary” because “the court 
and parties do not have to waste time and resources determining whether the plaintiff showed a 
deprivation of th[e] right.”). 











the case concerned a legal issue that had been adequately briefed and 
decided upon by the lower courts: whether the intracorporate-conspiracy 
exception applies to § 1985(3) claims.97 In order to decide this question, the 
Court would not have had to request further briefing; the lower courts would 
not have had to request more factual development in the pleadings, or spend 
substantially more time or costs in trial.98  
One of the main reasons for the Justices’ concerns over judicial economy 
is “that courts often confront qualified-immunity issues early on in the 
course of litigation,” particularly in motions to dismiss or motions for 
summary judgment.99 So, requiring the lower courts to fully consider the 
merits of an underlying alleged constitutional violation at such an early 
stage runs the risk of “bad decisionmaking,”100 especially given the limited 
resources of the lower courts early on in litigation. While the unnecessary 
expenditure of limited resources is an important concern for trial courts first 
hearing the qualified-immunity issue on a motion to dismiss or motion for 
summary judgment,101 it should not be a primary concern of the Supreme 
Court when hearing a qualified-immunity issue that has already traveled 
through multiple levels of litigation and appeal, as in Ziglar.102 Rather, 
precisely “because a judge who has chosen to reach the merits has decided, 
for one reason or another, to accept the costs, burdens, and responsibilities 
of adjudicating a constitutional issue,”103 as in Ziglar, the Supreme Court 
should rule on the lower court’s merits determination instead of punting the 
issue based solely on a not-clearly-established finding.  
For the Supreme Court to decide the legal issue in Ziglar, “there would 
be little if any conservation of judicial resources to be had by beginning and 
ending with . . . the clearly established prong.”104 The Justices’ careful 
                                                      
97. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 263 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Ziglar v. 
Turkmen, 137 S. Ct. 292, 196 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2016), and cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Turkmen, 
137 S. Ct. 293, 196 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2016), and cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 293, 196 L. Ed. 2d 211 (2016), 
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290 (2017). 
98. For an explanation of concerns over judicial economy and the types of inefficiencies that 
courts may confront if required to follow Saucier’s two-step sequencing, see Leong, supra note 29, 
at 680–82. 
99. Id. at 680 (“[I]n 2006 and 2007, 24.6% of cases in which a court addressed a qualified 
immunity issue took place on a motion to dismiss.”). 
100. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239 (2009). 
101. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 51, at 14 (“Justice Breyer’s dismissal of the enterprise as 
wasting judicial resources may be too strong, but there is surely something to the critique, especially 
when issues are poorly briefed or buried under a pile of intricate (and unproven) facts.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
102. See supra note 97.  
103. Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity and 
the Elaboration of Constitutional Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
643, 653 (2011). 












analysis was the only resource saved by the Ziglar Court’s decision to begin 
and end with the clearly established prong. 
The Pearson Court was also concerned with the parties’ expenditure of 
resources needed to litigate both the merits and clearly-established 
prongs.105 According to Pearson, a court should not perform Saucier’s two-
step sequencing when resolving the underlying constitutional or statutory 
question would “force[] the parties to endure additional burdens of suit . . . 
when the suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily.”106 
In Ziglar, however, like the judicial resources discussed above, the “costs 
of litigating constitutional questions and [the] delays attributable to 
resolving them”107 had already been borne by the parties.108 In fact, one of 
the main benefits of deciding the underlying statutory question in Ziglar 
would have been protecting parties to future § 1985(3) suits from having to 
re-litigate the legal issue. Now, given the Ziglar Court’s reluctance to decide 
whether the intracorporate-conspiracy exception applies to § 1985(3) claims 
by undertaking Saucier’s two-step sequencing,109 parties in future suits will 
have to expend their resources in order to litigate the issue.110 
While concerns for judicial economy and the parties’ resources may be 
warranted in some cases, Ziglar gives us an example of a time when such 
concerns should not be overly-heeded by the Supreme Court. The Ziglar 
Court would have served judicial economy more by resolving the merits 
determination.111  
B. Preservation for Appellate Review 
Another concern of the Pearson Court was that mandating Saucier’s 
two-step sequencing would be a waste of time where the constitutional or 
statutory question would “soon be decided by a higher court.”112 Further, 
the Court worried that lower courts resolving the constitutional or statutory 
question would “make it hard for affected parties to obtain appellate review 
of constitutional decisions that may have a serious prospective effect on 
                                                      
105. Id. at 237. 
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108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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their operations.”113 This concern—that making the merits determination 
while granting qualified immunity based on a not-clearly-established 
finding would preclude public officials from appealing the merits 
determination—is a legitimate and serious concern for the lower courts.114 
In 2011, the Supreme Court in Camreta v. Greene115 helped mitigate the 
severity of this issue. In Camreta, a child protective services caseworker 
and a county sheriff removed a child from her school classroom in order to 
investigate allegations of abuse.116 The constitutional determination before 
the Ninth Circuit was whether the removal of the child from the classroom 
and the subsequent interview without a warrant was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.117 The 
Ninth Circuit held that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment and that 
officials in the future must obtain a warrant before removing a child from 
his or her classroom in order to investigate allegations of abuse.118 The 
Ninth Circuit granted the officials qualified immunity, however, finding that 
at the time of their conduct the law was not clearly established.119 In 
Camreta, the Supreme Court held that unfavorable merits determinations 
when officials were granted qualified immunity on a not-clearly-established 
finding would be reviewable by the Court.120 That is, officials who win on 
qualified immunity but lose on the merits determination like in Camreta are 
able to appeal the merits determination.121 The Court limited its holding, 
however, stating that that the appealability of the merits determination was 
available only at the level of the Supreme Court. It withheld judgement on 
whether “an appellate court, too, can entertain an appeal from a party who 
has prevailed on immunity grounds.”122 While Camreta’s holding is “no 
silver bullet” for the appealability problem of Saucier’s two-part 
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sequencing, it is a major help.123 It allows the Court to review merits rulings 
on important constitutional issues even when defendants are granted 
qualified immunity.124 
Even independent of the Court’s assistance in Camreta, the appealability 
issue was not a legitimate concern for the Ziglar Court. In Ziglar, the Second 
Circuit had found both that there was a rights violation and that the law at 
the time of the officials’ conduct was, in fact, clearly established.125 The 
Second Circuit had thus denied the officials qualified immunity on the 
plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) civil-conspiracy claims.126 Therefore, the Ziglar 
petitioners were able to appeal both prongs of the Second Circuit’s decision, 
i.e., the officials could appeal both the merits and clearly-established 
determinations.127 In cases in which the lower court decides that the officials 
are not entitled to qualified immunity, as in Ziglar, the officials will be able 
to appeal both prongs of the lower court’s Saucier analysis. Accordingly, in 
such cases the appealability concern of the Pearson Court does not justify a 
court in declining to make the merits determination. 
C. Issues of Law Versus Fact 
The Pearson Court worried that Saucier’s two-step sequencing was not 
necessary when the constitutional or statutory question is “so factbound that 
the decision [would provide] little guidance to future cases.”128 In many 
excessive force cases the underlying question is highly fact-bound.129 For 
example, a court must decide a fact-bound issue when deciding whether 
police officers used excessive force by shooting a victim through the 
window of his house while investigating an earlier road rage incident.130 
                                                      
123. See Kirkpatrick & Matz, supra note 103, at 645 (2011) (arguing that Camreta “effectively 
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129. See infra notes 130–131 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, many Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases may be highly 
fact-bound, as when a court has to decide whether law enforcement officers 
violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights when they entered onto a 
ground-level deck in plaintiff’s backyard without a warrant.131  
The merits question at issue in Ziglar, however, was not so fact-bound, 
but was an entirely legal question of statutory interpretation as to whether 
the intracorporate-conspiracy exception applies to § 1985(3) claims.132 
Lower courts that have confronted this question have done so without 
relying on factual analysis. Usually courts look to the conflicting policy 
reasons behind the statute and the exception. For example, in Stathos v. 
Bowden,133 the First Circuit held that the intracorporate-conspiracy 
exception does not apply to § 1985(3) claims because of the exception’s 
origins in antitrust.134 Because of the intent of the statute to secure equal 
protection for citizens, without reference to the facts of the case, the First 
Circuit held that “the boundaries of an intracorporate exception to the § 
1985(3) conspiracy provision should be narrower than in antitrust.”135 The 
Sixth Circuit in Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School District 
Board of Education136 similarly performed a legal rather than a factual 
analysis in deciding if the intracorporate-conspiracy exception applies to § 
1985(3) claims.137  
The Pearson Court also suggested that if resolving the merits question 
“depend[s] on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed,” then courts 
should not perform the two-step sequencing and resolve only the clearly 
established prong.138 Once again this justification for employing Pearson 
discretion was not satisfied in Ziglar. As discussed above, the underlying 
statutory question at issue in Ziglar was an entirely legal question of 
statutory interpretation and did not depend on the particular facts of the 
case.139 In fact, even under Saucier’s two-step sequencing, the Court would 
have found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the 
law at the time of the officials’ conduct was not clearly established—this 
was the only potentially fact-bound issue in the case.140 Whether or not the 
intracorporate-conspiracy exception applies to § 1985(3) civil-conspiracy 
claims, however, did not depend on a “kaleidoscope of facts” not yet 
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developed. Instead, the solution to that question depended only on careful 
legal analysis by the Ziglar Court. 
D. Constitutional Avoidance 
The final major concern of the Pearson Court was that resolving the 
constitutional or statutory question may “depart[] from the general rule of 
constitutional avoidance.”141 The principle of constitutional avoidance is 
rooted in Justice Brandeis’s statement in his concurrence in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority142 that the Court should “not pass upon a 
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is 
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”143 
Alexander M. Bickel famously praised the principle as a significant 
“passive virtue” of the Court.144 
Outside of the realm of qualified-immunity adjudications, the “passive 
virtues” of the Court have been both criticized and defended by a number 
of scholars. For example, Cass Sunstein, a proponent of judicial 
minimalism, argues that passive virtues such as constitutional avoidance are 
preferable to judicial activism “from the standpoint of deliberative 
democracy” in order to uphold what Sunstein calls the “democracy-
permitting outcomes” of the other two branches of government.145 Critics of 
judicial minimalism argue that the passive virtues are a farce for what is, in 
fact, judicial activism because the Court exercises avoidance and the other 
passive virtues strategically.146 
Regarding the order-of-battle dilemma within the qualified-immunity 
doctrine, scholars are similarly split. It is difficult to balance the prudential 
and counter-majoritarian reasons for preferring a restrained Court from the 
practical benefits of a Court that articulates the law and prevents 
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constitutional stagnation.147 The Court’s holdings in Saucier and Pearson 
reflect this difficulty.148  
This Note joins the list of scholars who have concluded that avoidance 
as a justification for the expansion of qualified immunity is an unacceptable 
“impediment to the development of new constitutional law in civil rights 
damages actions.”149 First, constitutional tort law is not an ideal context for 
constitutional avoidance because its main goal is deterrence.150 Where 
courts consistently avoid merits determinations and grant qualified 
immunity on a not-clearly-established finding, deterrence of public 
officials’ illegal conduct fails.151 Second, avoidance in the qualified-
immunity context “poses the distinct danger of redefining substantive 
constitutional law” because it denies injunctive relief even against allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct.152 Avoidance that perpetuates the expansion of 
qualified immunity defines “the meaning of constitutional protections from 
whatever the legitimate authorities believe the Constitution requires to some 
lesser standard of reasonable misperception.”153 Lastly, and most 
importantly, the articulation of law in the qualified-immunity context is 
especially valuable because of the individual hardship endured by citizens 
when unconstitutional conduct is permitted to continue because the court 
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holds only that the law surrounding the conduct is not clearly established 
without engaging on the constitutionality of the conduct.154 
Ziglar presents a good vehicle to reconsider the doctrine of Pearson 
discretion, and specifically to analyze the Pearson Court’s constitutional 
avoidance concern, for several reasons. First, the merits question in Ziglar 
was not addressing a constitutional tort such as excessive force or 
unreasonable search and seizure like the Court’s many other qualified-
immunity cases.155 Rather, the merits determination in Ziglar was primarily 
one of statutory interpretation.156 Constitutional avoidance is premised on 
the idea that the Court should pass on constitutional questions when 
possible, not necessarily that the Court should pass on statutory questions.157 
The Ziglar Court was asked to decide if § 1985(3) allowed for an 
intracorporate-conspiracy exception, based primarily on Congress’s 
intention in passing the statute.158 Usually constitutional avoidance is 
preferred based on a respect for the political, majoritarian branches of 
government.159 Yet this justification for avoidance should have been less of 
a concern for the Ziglar Court given the unique history of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act, part of which is now codified as § 1985(3).160 Section 1985(3) is the 
exact kind of democratic effort that the Ziglar Court should have been 
dedicated to upholding, not avoiding. 
In addition, the peculiar nature of a § 1985(3) claim requires that the 
officials’ conduct be motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”161 Because of the “narrow intent 
requirement [that] erects a significant hurdle for § 1985(3) plaintiffs,”162 
prior to Ziglar, there was a circuit split even relating to the availability of 
qualified immunity for federal officers against § 1985(3) claims.163 Thus, it 
seems especially odd that the Court in 2017 would decline to resolve the 
legal issue on the merits, and instead, choose to keep the law on § 1985(3) 
actions in flux. The principle of constitutional avoidance did not adequately 
justify the Ziglar Court’s choice to withhold judgment on the contours of a 
citizen’s statutory right to be free from civil conspiracy under § 1985(3). 
                                                      
154. See id. (“The[] costs [of merits avoidance] are not measured solely, or even chiefly, in the 
persistence of uncertainty in the law. The greater problem is the underenforcement of constitutional 
rights while such uncertainty continues.”). 
155. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
156. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017). 
157. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
158. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1867. 
159. See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 37–38. 
160. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
161. Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 970 F.2d 785, 794 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting 
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983)). 
162. Id. 
163. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 












This Note has proposed a way of limiting the Supreme Court’s “quiet 
expansion of qualified immunity”164 by re-casting the Court’s principle 
concerns and holding in Pearson v. Callahan. It has suggested a four-part 
balancing test for courts to use in exercising Pearson discretion in a 
qualified-immunity case. It has argued that the Court should adhere to 
Saucier’s two-step sequencing and decide both the merits and clearly-
established determination of a qualified-immunity analysis when (1) doing 
so would serve judicial economy by preventing re-litigation of an entirely 
legal issue; (2) officials are able to appeal both prongs of a Saucier analysis 
because the lower court has decided that the officials are not entitled to 
qualified immunity; (3) analysis of the issue will be primarily legal and not 
fact-bound; and (4) the articulation of the law, especially a statute passed 
with great democratic support, outweighs the prudential benefits of 
constitutional avoidance. This Note analyzed the Court’s recent decision in 
Ziglar to show how such a balancing test would operate in practice. While 
the defense of qualified immunity serves an important societal goal, a more 
nuanced test for exercising Pearson discretion is needed to curtail its 
unchecked expansion. 
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